PR for the Canadian home of Representative Democracy?

The election in Ontario was an interesting one for a number of reasons. It illustrated the likely currency of Reform-oriented ideas in 21st Century Canada, as the Conservatives were punished for championing religious schools. It showed the NDP can still stand up advocating for the worst off and that there is, at least in Upper Canada, an interest in majority government. The event also rendered a third Canadian decision on the popularity of proportional representation (PR), Ontarians favouring it less than our friends on the West Coast or in PEI.

Those who were promoting PR in Ontario believe that the campaign to change the electoral system failed partly because people just didn’t understand it. If this is the case, there may be a solution.

There are a variety of models for PR, both in political discourse and in the practice of other countries. My preference would for the simplest, one friendly to the important role that political parties play.

In Nova Scotia, which celebrates a milestone next year in the history of representative democracy in Canada, PR could mean roughly the following. Assume that we move back to 50 MLAs, a tax-saving, as well as for ease of understanding this example.

PR would split the MLAs into two sorts. The first, say 35, would be elected as they are currently, in electoral competition in constituencies. (To move from 53 current to 35 MLAs would mean, of course, that some constituencies would need to be larger than they are right now, but given remarkable improvements in the technology of communication this would not be such a big deal).

Each party would have constructed a list of 15 candidates, other than those running in the constituency contests, said lists determined by the parties on the basis of how they wish to appeal to the electorate.

We would vote as we do now, electing those whom we prefer from our constituency contests. Once the election was completed, the chief electoral officer would declare elected from the party lists, in the order of names listed, enough MLAs to ensure that each party had in the House the same proportion of MLAs as they had proportion of the vote.

So if the Progressive Conservatives elected 10 MLAs from constituency contests, winning 30 per cent of the popular vote, the chief electoral office declares the first five candidates from the PC’s list elected, giving them a total of 15 MLAs (30 per cent of 50 seats).

The number of MLAs for each party accordingly would be rendered roughly equivalent to the popular vote received by each party. (Ironically, though the Conservative Party of Ontario opposed the PR proposal, they would have elected 30 MPPs instead of the 26 they now have, if this were the model.)

Arguments for and against

There is a variety of arguments for and against such a shift in our electoral system. Three of the claims against are that PR would create two different sorts of representatives, ordinary constituency folks and the “stars” on the party list; it would produce fewer majority governments; and potentially trigger more elections.

On the yea side are claims that the outcome would be fairer; it would encourage more political engagement, and it would be more representative. Its representative improvement would stem from the fact that minor parties, currently shut out of the assembly though they garner a significant share of the vote, would actually win some seats (e.g. the Greens, whose eight per cent of the vote got them not a seat in Ontario in the current system).

It would also be more representative as the lists made up by the party would likely better reflect our diversity as a society; for instance, producing a proportionate number of women in the Assembly.

Now if all this is still too complicated for a referendum, perhaps we might just test the principle. Why not the following? “The percentage of seats in the Legislature should be roughly the same as the percentage of votes each party wins in a provincial general election: agree or disagree?”

Then let the legislature sort out how it wishes to accomplish this. Indeed, why not just adopt the rough suggestion above, where the voters’ behaviour changes hardly a bit from what they do now, but where every vote ends up counting?